In this article, we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature: the relative role of public and private (market-based) sanctions in deterring misconduct. We harness recent developments in opinion mining to offer a novel framework, which accounts for public sanctions and a more direct measure of private sanctions. We propose using the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of misconduct as a measure of reputational effect and thus an approximation of the private sanction. As a demonstration, we combine event study techniques, sentiment analysis, and classic econometrics on a sample of 339 listed companies belonging to 150 cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1992 and 2015. Our main finding is that in the context of cartels, public and private sanctions act as complements, but only if the cartel directly affects atomistic customers. In other cartels, we found no consistent relationship between public and our measure of private sanctions. 
Introduction
Most illegal behaviour faces two types of sanction: a public sanction, imposed directly by an administrative body or the court; and a market-based one (private sanction), which materialises indirectly through market mechanisms. The law and economics literature that studies private and public sanctions seems to agree that private sanctions can deter corporate misbehaviour, inasmuch as the offenders internalise the social cost of the offences; and concords on the point that public sanctions are needed when the harm caused by the offence is not internalised. because the share price valuation reflects investors' expectations of loss in future profits at lower levels of reputation. This might entail expectations that future sales will drop, or that firms will have to spend on correcting measures (extra advertising or price drops) to mitigate the reputational damage.
We provide an important methodological contribution by offering a more direct way to measure determinants of the magnitude of the reputational effect. Recent developments in opinion mining and natural language processing allow us to extract the opinion in the media coverage of corporate offences, and to study the relationship between share price valuation and opinion (Van de Kauter et al. (2015) ). To the best of our knowledge, no such analysis has been conducted to investigate the effectiveness of private sanctions on firms' behaviour. The context of illegal cartels gives us an ideal ground to test this framework. When the regulator discovers a cartel, this information is not automatically distributed to all related parties (especially not to atomistic consumers). Various information channels are in action to pass the news on the cartel conduct to the public. We offer a way to measure the sentiment and the spread of this information, and because without this information there would be no reputational impact, we posit that the sentiment and the intensity of the information is directly proportional to the reputational effect.
Our proposal offers a workable, and easy-to-implement framework for studying private and public sanctions. The public sanctions are directly obtained from administrative and court decisions and private sanctions are approximated by a reputational effect, which we measure through the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of the misconduct. We estimate the effect of these measures on the market valuation of offending firms. One of the main advantages of this framework is that data on media exposure is easily available from public sources. To demonstrate this, we use a publicly available dataset on EU cartels assembled by the European Commission (Commission), which we merge with a database on news articles that document and describe the illegal cartel (and cartel members) behaviour. We do a count of news sources per cartel member as indicator of exposure of each cartel member to the news, and then quantify the opinion of each news' item using sentiment analysis. Loss or gain in market valuation is used as a proxy for the deterrence power of these two types of sanctions.
Our empirical strategy gives us an opportunity to look at the relative role of public and private sanctions in deterring misconduct. Based on the premise that businesses are averse to falling market valuation, we assume that sanctions with larger negative effect on valuation act as stronger deterrent. We then estimate the relative effect of public and private sanctions on firms' market valuation. If the two are substitutes, lower public sanctions will not result in lowered valuation if private sanctions increase at the same time. This follows the same logic as Karpoff and Lott Jr (1993) . On the other hand, there is also a possibility that public and private sanctions act as complements. Iacobucci (2014) provides a theoretical framework to demonstrate that the size of the public sanction affects the size of the private sanction and larger fines are associated with larger reputational punishment. The intuition behind this is that as public attitude is likely to be influenced by news on the magnitude of sanction, which is perceived as directly proportional to the seriousness of the offence. In this case increasing public sanctions only drive down market valuation if at the same time private sanctions also increase. Our paper will provide a behaviour specific test to which of the two prevails in the case of cartels.
European cartels -institutional setting
We use cartels detected by the European Commission as illustration of our proposed framework.
To give a brief institutional introduction, in the European Union, the principal body in charge of investigating cartels is the European Commission (at national level the member state competition authorities enforce anti-cartel laws). The investigation can start following: (a) a complaint, (b) the opening of an own-initiative investigation, or (c) a leniency application from one of the participants to a cartel. Following an initial investigative phase, the Commission decides whether to conduct an in-depth investigation -which typically starts with a dawn raid of the suspected cartel members'
offices. This is the first point at which the fact of the investigation is publically announced. However, there is some possibility that investors anticipate the investigation even before this date. It is not uncommon that a US cartel investigation is followed by an investigation in the EU. Once the Commission reached its decision, it consults the national competition authorities, and then the final decision is adopted by the full College of Commissioners. The parties to the case are informed directly of the decision, and at the same time the Commission issues a press release on key details of the decision, which includes the amount of the fine imposed on each infringing firm. If the cartel was reported by one of its members (leniency application), the fine can be reduced for this particular firm. Our study focuses on these two main announcements, the start of the investigation, and the final decision, and their effect on firms' share prices. This part of our analysis is similar to Aguzzoni et al. (2013) , but has a newer and more extensive dataset. We then study the interaction between the public sanction (EU administrative fine) and private sanctions on the cumulative abnormal rate of returns of shares.
Cartels are related party offences as it is the customer who directly suffers the harm, and therefore, based on previous literature, we would expect private (reputational) sanctions to have a deterrent effect. However, when it comes to cartels, interestingly, the academic discussion on the optimum amount of fines typically circumvents the issue of private (reputational) sanctions. Most discussion is limited to the optimal magnitude of the administrative or criminal fine, or the possibility of custodial sentences. For monetary sanctions the argument is that, they should account for the total social cost of the cartel. Karpoff and Lott Jr (1993) argues that in the case of fraud this would lead to over-deterrence because it ignores the effect of private sanctions. For cartels, there seems to be an understanding that too high sanctions on cartel activity do not chill any legitimate, procompetitive conduct that could be mistaken for cartel activity; therefore, over-deterrence is not an issue. Whilst we are not convinced that this is true for some vertical agreements, there is another problem with overly stringent fines -that they may cripple the business and force them to exit the market, thereby potentially making it even less competitive.
Moreover, we believe that neither public nor private sanctions should be studied individually on their own. Size and gravity of determinants of private sanctions are driven by the magnitude of public sanctions -in which case the public sanction acts as a signal to the gravity of the offence -i.e. without public sanctions, private sanctions would not be effective Iacobucci (2014) . On the other hand, the effectiveness of public sanctions may depend on the presence of private sanctions and on the underlying environment. This would mean that for public sanctions to be effective they would have to be administered as part of a cocktail with private sanctions, and the relative dosage would depend on the context of the case.
The paper proceeds with an introduction of the various types of data sources needed for the study.
In Section 4 we present the methodologies. Section 5 discusses the results and looks at whether public and private sanctions are substitutes or complements in deterring misconduct. Section 6 concludes with a discussion.
Data
Our data is based on cartels that were prosecuted by the European Commission. The data consists of information on cartel characteristics and the list of companies that participated in the cartel activities. For the population of listed (public) cartel members we collated information on share price and market performance, along with their capitalisation, prior and post the Commission's detection and decision cartel dates. Finally, to gain insight on the possible reputational damage, we put together a dataset made of media articles (newspapers, magazines and news agencies). We describe each piece of data source separately and provide a cohesive discussion towards the end of the section.
3.1. Cartel data. We collected information on cartel characteristics and dates of detection and decision for 150 European private cartels convicted by the Commission during the period 1992-2015.
The information is retrieved from public documents available on the Commission's website. A summary of cartel characteristics is offered in Table 1 , which reveals a few things about missing observations. In particular, it was not possible to retrieve full information on cartel coverage of the market, and on the existence of a ringleader for a number of cartels. For 29 cartels, we could not find any information on their characteristics. Nonetheless, for the cartels we have information on, we note that, on average, cartels lasted less than 8 years, were composed of about 7 firms, and covered 83% of the market. Over 80% of cartels involved price fixing, and two thirds of cartels had market share agreements. 3.2. Cartel member (firm-level) data. Along with the cartel characteristics, we gathered details on the firms that participated in the cartel activity. The documentation provides information on the name of the firms that took part in the cartel, the fine they were charged before leniency was applied, the percentage of leniency reduction, and the new fine calculated after the leniency discount. An example of the information that is available is provided in Table 2 for the Air Cargo cartel, labelled in the Commission's documents as "Airfreight" cartel. Fourteen firms belonged to that cartel, of which Lufthansa (and its subsidiary Swiss Airlines) received full immunity from fines, as it was the first to apply for leniency and help with the cartel investigation. The full dataset of cartel member accounts for 767 firms -13% of those are recidivist. Some of these firms are publicly listed, and for these we collected information on their share prices around the detection and decision date, as discussed in the next section.
7 For most of the analysed period, settlement was not an option. Therefore, our sample does not contain settlement cases.
3.3. Stock market data. A third dataset includes cartel members' share prices, their capitalisation and corresponding market value. We downloaded daily share prices (adjusted for dividends)
for all listed firms in our sample from Datastream. We also downloaded daily prices for their respective home market index, as well as their market capitalization in their home market. 8 Daily prices spanned from one year before the detection and decision dates, to one year after each of these dates. For a small number of companies we could not retrieve share prices prior to the detection date (because they had not become public yet), and for an even smaller number we were unable to find data before the decision date (because the companies had been de-listed or bought out by that time). This selection mechanism produced a final sample of 339 publicly listed firms, which had share prices either around the raid or around the decision (or around both periods).
3.4. Media articles. The last fragment of data consists of news articles on the cartel and cartel member behaviour, downloaded from Nexis R service of the LexisNexis information solution.
Nexis R aggregates information from a huge body of international news, business articles, businessrelevant websites, blogs and forums.
The Nexis search engine accepts individual words or strings, and then identifies and retrieves thousands of articles that contain the specified word(s). For each cartel, we collated English written news that reported and described cartel behaviour during the time window: one day before and after the cartel decision. 9 We searched according to the boolean rule: "name firm1" OR "name firm2" OR ... "name firm N" AND "price fix" OR "cartel". To be more inclusive, when appropriate, we employed both the original name of the company and its abbreviation with the use of the Boolean OR (e.g. "British Airways" OR "BA"). The period of the search was extended from the day before the official EU press release detailing the cartel conviction decision, to the day after.
By including the day before the announcement we aimed at capturing media articles that discussed the imminent decision of EU on the day before (if there was any leakage of information). With the inclusion of the day after we aimed to capture print news sources that were late in reporting the European Competition Commission's decision, either due to time zone differences or the fact that 8 We used a major, broad, capitalization-weighted index of the local (home) market of the firm (Campbell et al. (2010) ).
For example, for British firms we used FTSE 100, for US firms we used S&P 500, and so on. For developing countries with no data on such indices, we used the corresponding Datastream calculated index. 9 We opted for publications in the English language only. This may result in a bias in favour of publications from English speaking countries and firms. However, our decision is based on two premises: Firstly, it would be impractical, if not impossible, to include in our search string the translated terms "cartel" and "price-fix" in all languages. Secondly, not specifying the terms "cartel" and "price-fix" to allow for all languages would generate much noise (i.e. company-related news irrelevant to the cartel conviction decision). Furthermore, these news pieces can be in languages that we do not command, and distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant news releases would be an impossible endeavour. Finally, all the cartels in our sample are of international nature and were likely to have been reported by English language news sources.
European newspapers are normally printed in the morning, hence may miss the EU decision on the day it takes place. Articles typically differ in length, number of firms they list, and in the opinion, they deliver to the reader. Take the Banana cartel (2009) as an example. 15 news articles covered that cartel (see Table   3 ), and there is variation in their length (and content), but also in the number of firms (companies) that are cited. Articles may refer to a single company, multiple companies or no companies at all, as it happens when articles do not mention any company name, and talk only about the cartel. For the Banana cartel (2009), there is limited variation in the number of firms mentioned in texts, but this is not a common pattern. 3.5. General overview of the data. Summing up, in this paper we assemble four different datasets. One difficulty we had to face in combining the datasets is that there was no uniform convention on naming the firms. While it was not much of a problem merging the Commission and share price datasets, it was challenging to cope with the news article data, as there, the same firm was named differently in alternative news articles. This complicated the identification of unique firms within the same cartel and the merging of news articles with the other databases. For example "British Airways", appears shortened as "BA", or with a dash "British-Airways" or in modified versions, such as "British Airway" or "BritishAirway". Additional complexity was to deal with non-English firm names, such as "Société des Industries Chimique du Fluor" or "Novácke Chemick Zvody and 1.garantovaná". We addressed this challenge by constructing a dictionary of synonyms for combinations of firm names. By fixing the firm's name synonyms, we managed to retrieve 728 observations of firms (a small proportion of which are recidivist firms) out of the original Commission's database of 767 firms. Of those firms, 339 are publicly listed and have data around either or both raid and decision periods.
Methodologies
In this section, we give an overview of the two main methodologies used in our analysis: event study, and opinion mining (sentiment analysis). Though the efficient market hypothesis literature introduced by Fama (1965) and then extended by Malkiel and Fama (1970) has been criticized by behavioural finance (Kahneman and Tversky (1974) and Shiller (1981) ), its core -that information integrates into share prices immediately -still remains a principle widely accepted in the business, economics and finance literature. Recent development of text analysis contributes to this literature with sophisticated tools able to produce richer secondary data to study the relationship between share markets and opinion (Van de Kauter et al. (2015)).
4.1. Event study. We calculate the firm and market index return by taking a first difference of the corresponding log share prices. We use the market model (see Brown and Warner (1980) and Brown and Warner (1985) ) to obtain a counterfactual return, and then employ a standard event study methodology (MacKinlay (1997) ) to compute the daily abnormal returns (AR) for individual firms, and their cumulative version (CAR) over a number of different event windows. Given that part of our data overlaps with that in Aguzzoni et al. (2013) , we benchmark our results to theirs (see Table 7 in the Appendix for a throughout comparison). 10 The window for CAR spans from 20 days before the detection or decision dates, to 10 days after (31 days in total). The null hypothesis that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is zero is tested against the alternative that is greater than zero, this is tested based on the adjusted BMP test (see Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) ).
This test has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional correlation, while being robust to serial correlation.
Sentiment analysis.
Text mining is the process of extracting useful information from un- (2015)).
We use sentiment analysis (opinion mining) to understand the sentiments (or opinions) being presented in media reports. Sentiment analysis is the computational analysis of the opinion, sentiment, and subjectivity in a text. This is done by speech tagging: breaking down the semantic structure of sentences and determining which emotional words apply to a given keyword. Sentiment is derived using a lexicon, which contains lexical units of a given language, and the sentiment associated to them. We use a simple binary sentiment value, where words or combinations of words are assigned one of the following three polarity values: -1 for negative, 0 for neutral, and 1 for positive sentiment.
There is a large number of sentiment lexicons available. 11 For the purposes of this article, we rely on two different lexicons. One of them is the word polarity dictionary composed by Hu and Liu (2004) , which contains around 6800 positive and negative opinion words or sentiment words for the English language. This dictionary is optimised for customer product reviews, and is a fairly general set of sentiment scores. We use this dictionary as an approximation of how a layperson would interpret a general business related news item (below, we refer to this as 'general' lexicon). On top of this, we also employ an augmented version of the same dictionary, where we use a modified 10 There is some misalignment in the results, because Aguzzoni et al. (2013) took the index of the market where the firm had the highest market capitalization, whereas we have chosen the local market. 11 We experimented with a number of these, results are available from the authors.
dictionary in order to capture how subjectivity changes in a specific topic such as that of cartels.
We did this through induction. Our research team -who are experts in the area of cartels -judged the word-level sentiment in terminology specific to the context and prevalent in our sample of news articles. We then introduced additional terms based on observed frequent co-occurances. This way we added another 600 words, bi-grams and tri-grams to our dictionary (we refer to this as 'custom' lexicon).
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We begin the analysis of article scoring by relying on the most common sense of words. As expected the great majority of the articles produce a negative score. The density of the sentiment per-firm is represented in Figure 1 . The density curves confirm that using the custom lexicon gives more negative interpretations of the same article than using the general lexicon. We also listed the cartels that were most negatively covered by the press. Table 4 shows the cartel that were reported most negatively by the press, using our own custom cartel-dictionary and the general polarity lexicon. The Car-glass, Airfreight, and the Banana cartels are top of the list for both dictionaries. 4.3. Econometric model. In much the same way to Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Karpoff et al. (2008) we regress the cumulative abnormal rate of return (shortened with C in the notation The first one is media intensity (exposure, E), which is given by the number of articles documenting a cartel member misconduct. The second one is the average (by firm) sentiment of these articles (S). We regress CAAR (C) against a set of control variables (mainly cartel-level variables), and a function of the three key variables. The econometric equation for the firm j is: 
Results
In this section, we first discuss the predicted abnormal rate of returns and then address the effect of private and public sanctions on the (cumulative) abnormal rate of returns. Table 5 displays the average abnormal rate of return from 20 days prior to the event, to 10 days after the event, where the event represents either the raid or the decision about the cartel conviction. The table also reports the p-value of one-tailed test J-statistic.
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The average abnormal rate of return is negative and mildly significant both at the day of the raid, and at the day of the decision. The drop in share prices is more accentuated at the raid, 0.73%, than at decision, 0.33%. There are a couple of mildly significant drops in returns 6 and 9 days prior to the raid. The largest reduction occurs 9 days before the raid. This is not what one would expect as raids are supposed to be secret and therefore unanticipated. Aguzzoni et al. (2013) have investigated this anomaly.
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A sharp drop in price is not present around the decision date, as highlighted in the third column of Table 5 .
Anticipation of the investigation of cartel is confirmed by a graphical inspection of the trend of the cumulative average abnormal rate of return captured by the dotted line in Figure 2 , which shows a drop in the CAAR around the raid. Interestingly CAAR for the decision dates has a similar trend, but is smoother than CAAR for detection -with a less pronounced decline around the decision date (i.e. with larger anticipation effect).
The analysis of the cumulative average abnormal returns displayed on the bottom panel of Table 5 shows that share prices significantly (or mildly significantly) drop around the raid. By looking at 15 For example, Atochem and Akzo appear in the original dataset 9 and 7 times, respectively. 16 The abnormal rate of return estimation is conducted using the Stata package eventstudy2, written by Kaspereit (2016) . 17 They dropped cases that had previously been investigated in the US or where leniency had been applied to the cartel, but found that results were even worse (i.e. more accentuated drop in prices prior to the raid) when these problematic observations were removed. the [-10,10 ] window, the model predicts that the cartel decision deflates prices by 2.04%, of which negative 0.68% is cumulated in the immediacy of the decision (±1 day). The CAAR suggests that there is a mild effect on share prices in the immediacy of the decision, but this is an average effect.
There are firms whose cumulative share prices ±1 day of the decision is largely positive (top 1% cumulative abnormal price is +9.62%), and firms where the effect on share prices is substantially negative (bottom 1% cumulative abnormal price is -17.18%). The standard deviation is 4.27%.
This heterogeneity is exploited in the final stage of the empirical analysis, which is discussed in the next section.
5.1. The impact of private and public sanctions. We regress the cumulative average abnormal rate of return for each of the three time intervals displayed in the bottom panel of Table 5 against a set of control variables and the four key variables included in the g function in Equation 1. We Figure 2 . % CAAR around the raid and the EU decision date [-1,1] conduct the analysis only at the decision date because very few (in most cases zero) media articles were published around the raid.
The time trend of the four key variables is plotted in Figure 3 . It can be seen that CAAR [-1,1] , and the number of news articles are characterised by a steady trend: downward the former, and upward the latter. By contrast, standardised fine over market capitalisation and standardised sentiment display an inverse U-shape and U-shape relationships, respectively. There seems to be an inverse relationship between normalised fines and standardised sentiment, but not clear pattern between number of news articles and fine emerges. In the sentiment analysis we did not include the fine in the analysed texts (the amount was excluded from the text), however even with this exclusion, it is normal to expect negative correlation between the fine and the sentiment. The regression results are reported in Table 6 . We have information on the CAAR for 300 publicly listed firms, but 14 observations were not suitable to be included in the analysis, as they presented a value of fine over market capitalisation in excess of 30%, which we suspect to be a measurement error. We thus dropped those observations. There is no information on cartel duration (and other characteristics) for 35 observations. Instead of dropping these observations, we add a zero to duration and additionally include the dummy variable missing cartel duration to account for tack of information. The baseline regression (column 1) does not include the two sources of private sanctions. Columns (2)-(3) account for the two determinants of private sanctions using the custom cartel-dictionary, and columns (4)- (5) repeat the exercise using the general polarity lexicon. The variables used as controls are cartel size, number of cartel members, a dummy for recidivist firms, a dummy indicating whether leniency was applied to that cartel, and a dummy for observations that had no data on cartels.
The fine imposed on cartel members appears to negatively affect share prices when we do not account for a reputational sanction. This would suggest, assuming rationality, that public sanctions are likely to act as a deterrent to corporate misbehaviour. The question is, whether reputational factors have any role to play? To decide, in columns (3) and (5) we included our measure of media exposure and sentiment, together with a number of interaction terms between the public fine and our measure of the private sanction (media exposure and sentiment). To help interpretation of these effects, in Figure 4 we document the marginal effect of the public sanction given various levels of media exposure and sentiment. As fines (over market capitalization) are standardised, a unitary increase in fines is equivalent to one standard deviation increase. We identify negative and positive sentiment based on the 5% and 95% distribution of the sentiment, and different levels of exposure.
A number of interesting findings arise. First of all, if exposure is very low the marginal effect of the fine is negative (larger fine, larger loss in market valuation) irrespective of the sentiment of the news coverage. Put differently, if businesses are not exposed much on the media pillory, then the only thing that affects the market valuation of the misbehaving business is the amount of fine they receive. As soon as there is larger negative exposure, the public fine loses its effectiveness.
If the sentiment is negative, then increasing exposure eliminates the negative effect of the fine.
If the sentiment is positive, then at low exposure the public sanction does not seem to have a significant effect but as the exposure of positive sentiment increases, the effect of the fine becomes more negative.
A central question in the law and economics literature is whether public and private sanctions are substitutes or complements in their deterrent effect. Karpoff et al. (1993) argue that public and private sanctions are non-perfect substitutes in terms of their deterrent effect. The above discussion provided some evidence that in the case of cartels, the administrative penalty has a more negative effect on the market valuation of the cartel members if there is no reputational damage. On the other hand, the negative effect of administrative penalty disappears if the news exposure is negative (i.e. there is a reputational penalty). Along the conventional breakdown of substitute/complement effects, this would serve as evidence that in this specific case public and private sanctions are substitutes, confirming the findings of studies like Karpoff et al. (1993) .
The above findings are stronger for the custom sentiment dictionary, which means that when readers are better informed about the negative consequences of cartels, their evaluation of cartel related news will be more damning. This would suggest that in order to maximise the negative effect of a misbehaviour, society should not only work on sanctioning deviant firms, but on improving public awareness about the seriousness of these offences, as it is a crucial component of effective reputational effects. 
Conclusion and discussion
We found some evidence that public fines are only effective if not substituted out by a negative reputational damage. This would suggest that when administering a pecuniary sanction, policymakers should consider the level and content of media exposure and use of language that lays bare the gravity of the conduct. Media exposure and the disseminated information can be seen as an endogenous factor, which can be influenced (controlled) by the regulator -for example if it wants to intensify the effect of private sanctions (naming and shaming). By ensuring that the public receives wider and more negative information on the discovered cartel, they can increase the reputational penalty.
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18 Of course, if the regulator were to use the cocktail of private and public sanctions on a more regular basis, then share prices might anticipate that. This would change the results presented in this work, possibly leading to no effect on high exposure, and larger positive effect for limited exposure -as this will be expected to be more of a rare event.
Although this paper is an application to cartel conduct, the evidence provided here has strong general policy implications. Most importantly, if private and public sanctions are indeed substitutes, then the fining bodies might want to account for the reputational damage before imposing a fine to avoid over-enforcement. Moreover, if the policymaker wants to further publicise the misconduct, and alert the public of the damage caused by such conduct, it will have an impact of how the public sanction affects deterrence.
This paper should be seen as a new framework to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the combination of private and public sanctions using sentiment analysis to retrieve information on how costumers and consumers are informed about the misconduct. However, there are important aspects that this work was not able to cover, but are worth studying in the future. There is much to learn on richer information on the exposure to the news. We have used a straightforward count of news as metric of exposure, simply because we did not manage to capture the readership of the various sources. We did try to gather this information, but variation of readership over time and lack of information on readership for online and offline sources became too much of a challenge to have consistently reliable figures. Another aspect worth researching is the different use of language for domestic companies and international companies. One could study the presence of a bias for domestic companies. A similar distinction can be drawn between industry specialised news, news agencies, and consumer news, as they may use different languages and trigger different sentiments.
These are ideas for future research on an area that there is still much to learn. Machine learning and artificial intelligence are fast evolving and their development helps making more of a routine the sentiment analysis conducted in this work.
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